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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 2008, the United States stock market lost roughly $1.2
trillion in market value after the House of Representatives rejected the
federal government’s proposed bailout plan.1 A recession that started with a
credit crunch in 20072 was causing stocks to plummet on the U.S. stock
market,3 and soon, Europe would be feeling it in full force as well.4 Three
years later, the recession’s effects had gone global, leaving the European
Union (EU) reeling and in desperate need of a bailout.5
Europe’s economic crisis began with concerns over sovereign debt—the
amount of debt that a country has on its books—specifically in Greece.6
Ireland7 and Portugal8 would soon face the same debt fears. The European
Council of March 24–25, 2011, recognizing the financial fragility of the
Eurozone, adopted the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as part of a
plan designed to help alleviate these concerns and prevent future crises.9
1

See Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed, CNN MONEY (Sept. 29, 2008, 9:10 PM),
http://mon ey.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm (detailing the panic
and turmoil surrounding the stock market’s nose dive in September 2008).
2
See Global Recession Timeline, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8242825.stm
(chronicling the events of the global recession).
3
Barbara Hagenbaugh, Adam Shell & Sue Kirchhoff, Official Recession News Hammers
Dow, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2008, 10:17 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/20
08-12-01-recession-pummels-dow_N.htm. For a more in-depth statistical analysis of the
2007–2009 recession, see The Recession of 2007–2009, U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics,
Feb. 2012, http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession_bls_spotlight.pdf.
4
Carter Dougherty, Europe Catching Up Quickly With U.S. Recession, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-euecon.4.191672
10.html.
5
See Brian Blackstone & William Horobin, Fresh Worries of Recession Grip Europe, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702046445045766504109
91502504.html (detailing the worsening outlook in Europe at the time).
6
See Europe at the Brink — A WSJ Documentary, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 2011, 8:58:55 PM),
http://live.wsj.com/video/europe-at-the-brink---a-wsj-documentary/AF34C290-FBD3-44A9-AF
A9-10E2AB7A8BFA.html#!AF34C290-FBD3-44A9-AFA9-10E2AB7A8BFA (discussing the
roots of the European recession); see also European Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (last visited Sept.
26, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/european_sovereign_d
ebt_crisis/index.html (detailing the events of the European Debt Crisis).
7
Larry Elliot & Jill Treanor, Ireland Forced Into New £21bn Bailout By Debt Crisis,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2011, 16:17 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/31/irelan
d-new-bailout-euro-crisis.
8
James G. Neuger & Anabela Reis, Portugal’s $111 Billion Bailout Approved as EU
Prods Greece to Sell Assets, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2011, 1:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-05-16/portugal-bailout-approved-as-eu-prods-greece-to-sell-assets.html.
9
See The European Stability Mechanism, ECB MONTHLY BULL. 71, 71, July 2011,
available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/art2_mb201107en_pp71-84en.pdf (providing a
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With a lending capacity of €500 billion,10 the ESM is designed to be the
permanent stability instrument for the EU.11
The EU originally anticipated that the ESM would go into effect on July
1, 2013, following member states’ approval of amendments to the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union and the Eurozone countries sign a
new ESM treaty.12 However, soon after the German Parliament passed the
measure, injunctions filed with Germany’s federal constitutional court, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG),13 prevented the president from signing
the package. The BVerfG heard these complaints on July 10, 2012.14
With the European economies still hurting,15 the BVerfG declared that the
German President had the authority to ratify the ESM.16 The court’s decision
cleared the way for the ESM to take effect soon and begin to stabilize the
Euro.17 However, the BVerfG was quick to limit the amount of debt
commitment that could be placed on Germany without its approval.18
This Note will address how the EU’s primary economic decision making
body, the European Central Bank (ECB), should tailor its future economic
and monetary policies to alleviate the sovereignty concerns of its member
states, particular those with greater financial strength like Germany. The
future strength of the EU may be at risk if it fails to address these concerns
because national governments’ primary concerns are the interests their
respective citizens, not the broader EU community.
In Part II, this Note will discuss sovereignty and its historical importance
in shaping today’s world. It will then examine the sovereignty and federalist
principles that German and United States courts explored in the BVerfG’s

comprehensive explanation of the background and purpose of the ESM).
10
Id. at 75.
11
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Preamble, ¶ 1, Feb. 2, 2012,
http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/5823E11/05-tesm2.en12.pdf.
12
See European Stability Mechanism, supra note 9, at 71.
13
German Court Could Issue Injunction Against ESM, SPIEGELONLINE (July 2, 2012), http://
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-constitutional-court-to-consider-anti-esm-compl
aints-on-july-10-a-842120.html.
14
German Court Hears Pleas Against Eurozone Bailout Fund, BBC NEWS (July 10, 2012,
12:55 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18780948.
15
Laurent Belsie, For These Four Nations, 2012 Is Worse Than the Great Recession,
CNBC (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/49056918.
16
German Court Backs Eurozone’s ESM Bailout Fund, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:31
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19567867.
17
Id.
18
Extracts from the Federal Constitutional Court of 12 September 2012, 2 BvR 1390/12,
available at http://www.bverfg.de/en/decisions/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html.
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recent ruling on the ESM and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Printz v.
United States.
In Part III, this Note will draw from the aforementioned cases the
sovereignty obstacles relevant to the EU and posit a manner in which the
ECB can navigate them going forward. This section will include a synthesis
comparing and contrasting the courts’ opinions; it will specifically address
the prevailing concerns and suggest a manner in which to alleviate them.
II. BACKGROUND
To fully appreciate the struggle the EU faces, one must first understand
the core issue of sovereignty and its historical importance. Sovereignty
refers to an independent nation or state’s absolute political authority.19 In the
United States, the Founding Fathers paid great attention to this principle in
establishing its system of federalism, codifying it in the Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union20 and again in the U.S. Constitution via
the Tenth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.21 Other countries such as
Australia,22 Switzerland,23 Austria,24 and Germany,25 also have provisions in
their respective federal constitutions protecting the sovereignty of their
states. This same desire to maintain autonomy is also a natural and
important concern when nations collaborate and sign treaties.
In the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), signed in 1992,
concessions were made from the outset that protected the rights of certain
nations and their laws.26 As the EU expanded, new treaties were agreed to in
order to help the EU deal with problems that arose. One such treaty, the
Treaty of Lisbon, was signed in December 2007 to replace a previously
19

Moore v. Smaw, 17 Cal. 199, 218 (1861).
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II.
21
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
22
AUSTRALIAN CONST. s 107.
23
CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST][CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 3 (Switz.).
24
BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG][CONSTITUTION] BGBl No. 1/1930, art. 16, ¶ 1
(Austria).
25
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ][GG][BASIC
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. 1, art. 70, para. 1 (Ger.).
26
See Maastricht Treaty, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank, art. 43, § 43.2, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0087000012 (“The central
banks of Member States with a derogation as specified in Article 109k(1) of this Treaty shall
retain their powers in the field of monetary policy according to national law.”); see also
Maastricht Treaty, Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 4 (“The United Kingdom shall retain its powers in the field of
monetary policy according to national law.”).
20
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proposed European Constitution, which the French and Dutch governments
opposed.27 The new treaty replaced Article 3 of the Treaty on European
Union,28 which dealt with the powers conferred on both the EU and its
member states.29 The new version included the provision, “[c]ompetences
not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member
States.”30 It should be noted that, like in the case of the ESM decision this
Note analyzes, the BVerfG ruled on the constitutionality of the Treaty of
Lisbon before it was ratified.31 The chief concern in that case, like the ESM
case, was maintaining national sovereignty.32 There, the BVerfG found the
Treaty did not violate Basic Law,33 but ruled that an accompanying law was
in violation due to “the Bundestag34 and the Bundesrat35 [not being] accorded
sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking procedures and
treaty amendment procedures.”36 In permitting the Treaty, the court laid a
clear precedent for the future, saying that it will strike down anything
running afoul of the “inviolable core content of the constitutional identity of
the Basic Law and Article 23(1), Third Sentence, in conjunction with Article
79(3) of the Basic Law . . . .”37
27

See EU Leaders Sign Landmark Treaty, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/714
1651.stm (last updated Dec. 13, 2007, 16:17 GMT) (reporting on the signing of the Lisbon
Treaty).
28
Treaty of Lisbon, art. 1, § 5, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C. 306/12), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF.
29
See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 26, art. G.
30
See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 28, art. 3(a).
31
Press Release, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon compatible
with the Basic Law; accompanying law unconstitutional to the extent that legislative bodies have
not been accorded sufficient rights of participation (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.bun
desverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html.
The BVerfG also heard
arguments over the Maastricht Treaty. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, BVERFGE 89, 155 (Ger.) (ruling the constitutionality of the
Maastricht treaty). For a more detailed discussion of the general friction between the German
Constitutional Court and European law, see Jared Curzan, Comment, A Critical Linkage: The
role of German Constitutional Law in the European Economic Crisis and the Future of the
Eurozone, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1543, 1549–64 (2012).
32
Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 31.
33
The Basic Law is Germany’s constitution. For the entire text of the constitution, see
GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 25.
34
The Bundestag is the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany. For more
information see the Bundestag’s website, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/index.html.
35
The Bundesrat is the constitutional body in Germany’s government that allows the
Länder (states) to participate in federal decisions. For more information, see http://www.bun
desrat.de/nn_11004/EN/Home/homepage__node.html?__nnn=true.
36
BVerfGE, supra note 31.
37
Paul Gallagher, The Euro Crisis: Challenges to the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact
Treaty before the German Constitutional Court 2 (Inst. of Int’l & European Affairs, Working
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In today’s EU, the ideal of state sovereignty requires equal, if not greater,
attention than in the past. The stakes are now much higher, given the global
economic uncertainty, and countries simply cannot afford to be without a
voice in policy making in this market. The ECB is seeing its arsenal of
powers expand,38 and thus will likely be responsible for much of the
economic plans of the EU. It will also need to keep the principles of state
autonomy in mind as it further carves out plans to pull Europe out of its
financial crisis. That is precisely why Germany’s highest court took a close
look at the ESM treaty.39 While the BVerfG’s decision offers guidance for
how to satisfy Germany’s constitutional concerns, the ECB would also gain
valuable insight into issues of state sovereignty by looking to U.S. case law.
An analysis of Printz v. United States,40 a gun control case dealing with
states’ rights, along with the BVerfG’s decision will help illuminate for the
ECB its member states’ concerns. In Part II.A, this Note will delve into the
German court’s decision and the sovereignty issues presented. Part II.B will
do the same for the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Printz.
A. The BVerfG Decides ESM Respects Statehood
The BVerfG faced immense pressure from both the Chancellor and the
German public when reviewing this case.41 The entire world was watching
and waiting;42 some even believed the future of the EU rested with the

Paper No. 10, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.iiea.com/blo
gosphere/challenges-to-the-esm-treaty-and-the-fiscal-compact-treaty-before-the-german-cons
titutional-court-by-paul-gallagher-sc-published (quoting 2 BvE 2/08 at Guidelines, para. 4)
(detailing the significance of the German Court’s decision).
38
Ian Traynor, European Central Bank’s Powers Grow but Can it Really Save the Eurozone?,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/11/europ
ean-central-bank-powers-grow (listing the various roles the ECB will take in the future).
39
Extracts, supra note 18.
40
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
41
See Siobhan Dowling, Euro Zone Holds Breath for German Court Decision, GLOBAL
POST (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/ge
rmany/120910/euro-zone-germany-court-esm (quoting German Chancellor Angela Merkel as
calling the ESM “of the utmost importance” and citing a then-recent poll in which fifty-four
percent of the German populace wanted to block the ESM).
42
See Europe Awaits Top German Court Ruling on ESM, RTTNEWS (Sept. 11, 2012, 2:09
AM),
http://www.rttnews.com/1962940/europe-awaits-top-german-court-ruling-on-esm.aspx
(describing the uncertainty of German officials and economists about what the court would
decide); see also Ellen Freilich, Stocks Slip, Euro Dips Before German Ruling, Fed, REUTERS
(Sept. 10, 2012, 4:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/10/us-markets-global-idUS
BRE88901C20120910 (analyzing the markets’ responses ahead of the German court’s decision).
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German court.43 The ESM needed Germany’s ratification for it to ever take
effect because of a provision in the ESM treaty that required ratification by
members totaling at least ninety percent of the ESM’s capital calls.44 If
enacted, the ESM would serve as an emergency fund to ensure the financial
stability of the Euro zone.45 The plan creates a €700 billion backstop for
member states, when combined with prior commitments.46 The fund could
provide support in the following ways: (1) provide loans to troubled member
states;47 (2) implement a bond-buying program to purchase debt instruments
from troubled countries via the primary market48 and the secondary market;49
(3) extend credit lines when needed;50 (4) grant loans to countries whose
financial institutions need help in “re-capitalisation.”51 While the consensus
was that these options would help stem the recession and provide much
needed support for the EU, opponents were concerned with the other details;
accordingly, despite a last minute request for delay,52 the BVerfG focused on
the opponents’ concerns.
The critical issue before the German court was whether accepting the
ESM treaty’s requirements violated the German Constitution, specifically
Article 79(3) (the “Eternity Clause”), which makes it impossible for “any
43
See Stephen Brown, German Court Holds Euro Zone Fate in Its Hands, REUTERS (Sept. 3,
2012, 5:06 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/09/03/eurozone-germany-court-idINL6E8JVI
WB20120903 (listing possible ways the German court could decide and the consequences of
each).
44
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 11, art. 48. Capital
calls occur when the ESM Board of Governors issues a demand for money from each member
state. See id. art. 9 (outlining the policy for capital calls. These calls can be made generally
(Art. 9(1)), to “restore the level of paid-in capital” (Art. 9(2)), or to prevent default (Art.
9(3)).). The total amount paid by a member state cannot exceed its pre-determined limit. Id.
For a list of ESM members and their designated capital amounts, see id. at Annex II. Also, for
a more detailed explanation of the capital calls, see Terms and Conditions of Capital Calls for
ESM, ESM ONLINE (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/Terms%20and%20conditio
ns%20of%20capital%20calls.pdf.
45
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 11, art. 3.
46
Id. art. 8; see also Frequently Asked Questions on the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), ESM ONLINE (Oct. 8, 2012), at A8, http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/FAQ%20ESM%20
08102012.pdf (answering several questions pertaining to the basic functions, framework, and
purpose of the ESM).
47
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 11, art. 16.
48
Id. art. 17.
49
Id. art. 18.
50
Id. art. 14.
51
Id. art. 15.
52
See German Court Says It Will Not Delay ESM Ruling, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/federal-constitutional-court-rejects-attempt-to-dela
y-esm-ruling-a-855082.html (reporting on the court’s decision to deny the petition for a new oral
hearing which would delay the original ESM hearing).
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national commitment to violate [constitutionally outlined] principles.”53 In
essence, Germany’s highest court sought to ensure that by agreeing to the
terms of the European bailout plan, Germany would not be giving up too
much of its national sovereignty. The BVerfG was primarily concerned with
the following issues of autonomy: (1) ensuring that Germany maintains
control over its budgetary matters;54 (2) limiting Germany’s liability to that
of its own choosing rather than obligations potentially based on decisions of
other states;55 and (3) not being able to exit the Treaty, if so desired.56 After
carefully examining these concerns, the BVerfG ultimately decided to deny a
temporary injunction, finding that the law likely did not violate Germany’s
Basic Law as long as certain provisions were accepted.57
The first issue decided by the German high court dealt with maintaining
the government’s ability to make its own financial decisions.58 One of the
most important functions of any government is controlling the state’s
finances, including making economic and fiscal policies and decisions. The
German court acknowledged this in saying, “the decision on public revenue
and public expenditure is a fundamental part of the ability of a constitutional
state to democratically shape itself. The German Bundestag must therefore
make decisions on revenue and expenditure with responsibility to the
people.”59 The court concluded that the Basic Law necessitates that budget
decisions ultimately be the exclusive right of the legislature and must be
made without outside influence.60
Without exclusive budgetary power, a government effectively loses its
ability to address issues as they arise. This control becomes far more
necessary in times of economic crisis. Here, the ESM provided that in the
event a member state “fails to pay any part of the amount due in respect of its
obligations . . . such ESM Member shall be unable, for so long as such
failure continues, to exercise any of its voting rights [in ESM policy
decisions].”61 The petitioners in this case argued that this provision was a
53

Gallagher, supra note 37, at 2; GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 25, art. 79, para. 3. The
principles protected under Article 79(3) are outlined in Articles 1 and 20. Article 1 protects
human dignity. GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 25, art. 1. Article 20 ensures that Germany is a
democracy that derives its authority from the people. Id. art. 20.
54
Extracts, supra note 18, ¶¶ 195–197.
55
Id. ¶ 198.
56
Id. ¶ 248.
57
Id. ¶ 208.
58
Id. ¶¶ 195–197.
59
Id. ¶ 194.
60
Id. ¶ 197.
61
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 11, art. 4, § 8.
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“gross violation” of Basic Law.62 In the event of even a short-term default
on payments owed, Germany could have its voting rights stripped, crippling
the Bundestag’s budgetary powers.63 Though the court noted that the ESM
treaty seemingly lacks a provision providing for a stay of the suspension
during the appellate process64 and acknowledged that the Bundestag could
not oversee any ESM decisions during the suspended period,65 the court
found that this provision did not violate the Basic Law.66 It reasoned that
because the Bundestag would be constitutionally required to budget for the
ESM’s financial obligations, it would always be able to pay its debts;
therefore, the court held, it would be virtually impossible for Germany to
lose its voting rights.67
On the second issue, the primary focus was ensuring that Germany would
not be required to take on the debt of others, which could constrain its own
budgetary powers.68 The size and frequency of the previously issued bailouts
made this a valid concern for the court.69 The petitioners argued this point as
well, claiming that in light of Germany’s existing outstanding debt and
liability, accepting the debt obligations imposed by the ESM treaty would
push Germany’s total outstanding debt and liability to a constitutionally
impermissible level.70 This resulted, they argued, from the ESM’s failure to
place limits on the liability of member states.71 The petitioners feared that
the end result would be detrimental to not only the current Bundestag but
also those in the future by “setting in motion an automatic process of liability
and performance which such a future Bundestag cannot escape.”72
The BVerfG recognized the validity of the issue, declaring “no permanent
mechanisms may be created under international treaties which are
tantamount to accepting liability for decisions by free will of other states.”73
However, the court found that the ESM did not subject Germany to such
62

Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 156.
See id. (“If the German voting rights were suspended, the Board of Governors and the
Board of Directors would be able to pass resolutions which could seriously impair the overall
budgetary responsibility of the Bundestag.”).
64
Id. ¶ 234.
65
Id. ¶ 235.
66
Id. ¶ 236.
67
Id. ¶ 237.
68
Id. ¶ 198.
69
See European Debt Crisis, supra note 6 (listing dates and amounts of the bailouts given
to European Union member states thus far).
70
Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 152.
71
Id. ¶ 154.
72
Id. ¶ 151.
73
Id. ¶ 198.
63
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liability.74 The court interpreted the first sentence of Article 8, Section 5,
which places limits on a state’s obligations,75 as setting an absolute ceiling
that Germany could not exceed.76 Still, to ensure that Germany would
indeed be free of the burden suggested by the Petitioners, the BVerfG noted
that approval of the Treaty was based on the assumption that its reading was
correct.77
The third sovereignty issue presented to the court pertained to Germany’s
ability (or inability) to freely exit the agreement and its impact on
“statehood.”78 The petitioners’ concern was that because the ESM lacks a
termination provision, a point conceded by the German Parliament,79
Germany would be locked in indefinitely and therefore subject to losing its
veto power should member strengths change relative to one another.80 The
BVerfG deemed this problem a technicality rather than a substantive or
practical issue.81 It determined that in light of the liability caps in place, no
express termination clause was needed.82 The court concluded that in
offsetting the lack of such a provision, the liability limitations meant that the
German Bundestag must analyze and approve on an individual basis every
proposed commitment to accept more debt or liability.83
Though the BVerfG ultimately found that the Treaty was in compliance
with the Basic Law,84 it noted that certain provisions might hamper the
Bundestag’s overall budget responsibility.85 To remedy this, the court
required that, upon the Treaty’s ratification, this possibility must be
prohibited by avowals made under international law.86

74

Id. ¶¶ 212–213.
See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 11, art. 8, § 5
(“The liability of each ESM Member shall be limited, in all circumstance, to its portion of the
authorised capital stock at its issue price.”).
76
Extracts, supra note 18, ¶¶ 212–213.
77
Id. (citing Bundestag printed paper 17/9045, p. 5); see also id. ¶ 248 (“With a view to the
binding limitation of the burdens on the budget . . . , which is to be ensured by a reservation to
this effect . . . .”).
78
Id. ¶ 158.
79
Id. ¶ 186.
80
Id. ¶ 158.
81
Id. ¶ 248.
82
See id. (“With a view to the binding limitation of the burdens on the budget . . . , the
safeguarding of the Bundestag’s overall budgetary responsibility does not require providing a
special right of resignation or termination in the Treaty.”).
83
Id.
84
Id. ¶ 208.
85
Id. ¶ 209.
86
Id.
75
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B. Sovereignty and Guns: An American Perspective
Similar to the BVerfG in the ESM case, the U.S. Supreme Court in Printz
weighed in on a multi-state effort in order to ensure that effort was
constitutionally valid. In Printz, the legislation at issue was the Brady Act of
1993.87 The Act was designed to place more stringent requirements on gun
dealers by creating a “national instant background-check system”88 and
having chief law enforcement officers (CLEOs) within each state enforce
interim provisions until it was operational.89 The provisions outline a threestep process that must occur before a firearm transaction can occur.90 First,
the gun dealer must obtain from the transferee a form, the Brady Form, with
personal information about the transferee along with a sworn statement that
he or she is not a member of any class of prohibited purchasers.91 Next, the
gun dealer must verify the transferee’s identity via a specified identification
document.92 Finally, the dealer must alert the CLEO of the transferee’s
residence and of the transaction, and give the CLEO a copy of the Brady
Form.93 Under the Act, the CLEO then has five days to notify the dealer if
the sale would be illegal; otherwise the dealer is clear to complete the sale.94
Under the Act, the CLEO was required to “make a reasonable effort to
ascertain within five business days whether receipt or possession would be in
violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local
recordkeeping systems are available.”95 Taking issue with essentially being
forced to do the federal government’s work,96 two CLEOs subsequently
challenged the Act’s constitutionality.97 The issue before the Court was
whether the federal government could compel a state to use its law
enforcement officers to implement a federal regulatory program.98
The Printz majority addressed several principles of state autonomy,
ultimately concluding that the federal government could not require the
states to enforce the program by devoting resources and manpower to help
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 902–03.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id.
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implement background checks for gun dealers.99 The Court held that “such
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our system of dual
sovereignty.”100 In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that the Brady
Act violated the following sovereignty principles: (1) states should continue
to be “independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of
authority”;101 (2) a state should not be placed in a zero-upside scenario where
the federal government gets credit for a program’s success, but the state
absorbs the burdens of its administration;102 (3) controlling a state’s officers
is, in effect, controlling the state, which is fundamentally not allowed;103 (4)
“where . . . it is the very object of the law to direct the functioning of the
state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual
sovereignty . . . [i]t is the very principle of state sovereignty that such a law
offends”;104 and (5) the Constitution protects the sovereignty of the states
even when the federal government wants to circumvent it with pure
intentions or in times of crisis.105
The first concern addressed a state’s nexus of control over its own
affairs.106
The government argued that the Brady Act should be
distinguished from the precedent established in New York v. United States,107
where the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that required the states
to create legislation to dispose of waste within its borders or to take title to
it.108 In New York, the Court ultimately ruled that states could not be forced
to implement a federal regulatory program.109 In Printz, however, the
government’s argument focused on the idea of enforcement rather than
policy making.110 It argued that since states were not being required to make

99
Id. at 935. For an in-depth analysis of the history of state sovereignty in the U.S. as it
pertains to Congress and the Constitution, see Kenneth R. Thomas, Federalism, State
Sovereignty, and the Constitution: Basis and Limits of Congressional Power, CRS Report for
Congress, Feb. 1, 2008, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30315.pdf.
100
Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
101
Id. at 928.
102
Id. at 930.
103
Id. at 931.
104
Id. at 932.
105
Id. at 933.
106
Id. at 928.
107
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
108
Printz, 521 U.S. at 926.
109
Id. (quoting New York).
110
Id. at 926.
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law, the Act did not violate their sovereign rights granted by the
Constitution.111
After dismissing the notion that the act does not require policy making
outright,112 the Court posited that, if true, the government’s position would
encroach more severely upon the states’ sovereignty.113 Mere enforcement
of federal laws, Justice Scalia said, would “reduc[e] [the states] to puppets of
a ventriloquist Congress.”114 The Court emphasized the necessity of the
states’ power to maintain control and independence “within their proper
sphere of authority,”115 calling it a crucial component of their right to
sovereignty.116 The Court further lambasted the government’s perspective by
analogizing it to federal officers being required to administer state law,117
declaring both equally abhorrent to the principles of dual sovereignty.118
The next sovereignty issue addressed the accountability of the
sovereign.119 The crux of the government’s argument in support of the
Brady Act on this front was that the state and federal officials remained just
as accountable under the Act’s requirements as before.120 The Court also
rejected this argument.121 Justice Scalia based the dismissal on the following
reasoning:
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of
implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of
Congress [could] take credit for “solving” problems without
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with
higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not forced
to absorb the costs of implementing a federal program, they are
still put in the position of taking the blame for its
burdensomeness and for its defects.122

111
112
113
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115
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Id. at 926–27.
Id. at 927–28.
Id. at 928.
Id. (quoting Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1977)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 929–30.
Id.
Id. at 930.
Id.
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The Court recognized that a sovereign state should not be forced to bear
the financial burdens of a program without reaping its benefits.123 In other
words, the Court can be interpreted as asserting that states are not to be
treated as mere pawns of the federal government.
Thirdly, the Court ruled that state officers should be treated as an
extension of the State,124 ensuring that the government could not create an
end-run around its ruling, thereby violating state autonomy. The Court said
that placing requirements on state officials was in essence placing
requirements on the State, and thus forbid it.125 In his dissent, Justice
Stevens argued that this case should be distinguished from New York on the
grounds that the Brady Act’s mandates were targeted at individuals and not
the state itself.126 The Court found this approach to be unpersuasive, going
so far as to say it “disembowels [New York].”127 The majority analogized the
situation to one in which an individual is sued in his or her official capacity
as a state official.128 Citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,129 the
Court asserted that there is no difference between suing a person in his or her
official state capacity and suing the State itself because the official’s office is
being sued, not the individual.130 The Court therefore ruled that a declaration
forbidding control of a State while still allowing control of its employees
said nothing at all.131
Next, further emphasizing its desire to ensure state autonomy, the Court
addressed that issue directly.132 The Court expressly forbade a law
“where . . . it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the
state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual
sovereignty.”133 The government then presented its case for utilization of a
balancing test in this situation that would weigh against each other the
benefits of the proposed program and the burdens it places on the respective

123

Id.
Id. at 930–31.
125
Id. at 931.
126
Id. at 964–67.
127
Id. at 931. Moreover, Justice Scalia found this argument insulting. He seemed to rebuke
the other justices when he stated that the distinction between a suit against an individual in a
personal capacity and one in an official capacity is an ancient one that “is dictated by common
sense.” Id. at 930.
128
Id. at 930.
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491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
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Printz, 521 U.S. at 930–31.
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Id. at 931.
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Id. at 932.
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states.134 This test was ultimately deemed irrelevant,135 with the Court ruling
that “[i]t is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law
offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can
overcome that fundamental defect.”136
The fifth issue addressed the role of sovereignty on a macro-level: that of
the nation as a whole.137 Citing New York, the Court acknowledged that
historically courts have struck down measures that deviate from the form of
government outlined by the Constitution despite the measure’s best
intentions.138 The Court reasoned that the Constitution specifically provides
for separation of powers so that power does not become focused in one
place, even if it would be a convenient solution to a major problem of the
era.139 Ultimately, the Court in Printz used this rationale when ruling against
the Brady Act.140 The Court seemingly underscores the importance of
maintaining proper state autonomy by labeling sovereignty as a fundamental
block of the governmental system, which should not be compromised even if
it means quickly resolving a pressing issue.141
Unless appropriately addressed at the outset, sovereignty concerns like
those addressed in the German and American courts will arise again in the
future regarding ECB treaties. With the global economic climate rapidly
changing and fears mounting, the ECB must ensure going forward that its
plans do not run afoul of these concerns. Fortunately, with the decisions of
the German and American courts at its disposal, the ECB possesses the tools
to craft a plan that alleviates these apprehensions.
III. ANALYSIS
The principles outlined in the previous section provide clear guidance for
the ECB to design proposals that should effectively appease each EU
member state involved by respecting the boundaries between the ECB’s
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 933.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. The government sought to employ a balancing test to justify the utilization of state
officials to implement the Act, weighing the purposes of the Act against its burdens. Id. at
932. While admitting the test could possibly be used in some situations, where, as here, the
law’s sole focus is to direct the state’s executive, the Court deemed such an approach
“inappropriate.” Id.
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control and that of the states. This Note now moves to a synthesis of the two
courts’ views and then offers a set of proposals for future ECB measures.
First, this section will compare and contrast the two courts’ perspectives on
sovereignty issues, then address how to structure a deal so that the member
states maintain control over sensitive areas of national concern. The focus
will then turn to ensuring that member states are not forced into any
unwanted situations and do not have any unwanted circumstances forced on
them as a result of the ECB’s plan. Finally, this Note will concentrate on
ensuring that member states are not trapped by the plan in the event they
need to withdraw.
A. A Synthesis of the Two Courts’ Views
The two courts’ respective decisions displayed respect for the same
principles of sovereignty despite facing two distinct situations. Both courts
agreed on the need for state autonomy in decision-making;142 both also
affirmed that a state should not be exposed to liability beyond that which it
voluntarily undertakes.143 Finally, both agreed that sovereignty must not be
sacrificed for any reason.144
The first rule the courts agreed on was that states must have exclusive
jurisdiction over certain issues.145 It is essential to the functioning of any
governmental body that it have unquestioned control over certain areas and
in certain matters.146 Without this power, a government lacks any teeth in its
ability to govern and essentially becomes an agent for another authority.
142
See Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 194 (stating that Germany’s financial decisions must be
made by German officials); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 928 (asserting that states in the U.S.
must have control over matters within their authority).
143
See Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 198 (rejecting any plan that would subject Germany to
financial liability resulting from decisions of other countries); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 930
(forbidding the federal government from imposing requirements on the states that burden
them with liability for failure but give them no credit for success).
144
See Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 186 (recognizing the problems with a treaty not allowing
Germany any exit); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (stressing that dual federalism must not be
compromised even to solve a contemporary crisis).
145
See Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 194 (“The decision on public revenue and public
expenditure is a fundamental part of the ability of a constitutional state to democratically
shape itself.”); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 928 (“It is an essential attribute of the States’
retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere
of authority.”).
146
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating several actions held to be in the exclusive
authority of the Congress of the United States); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved by it to the States respectively, or the people.”).
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The second point of agreement pertained to a state’s exposure to external
liability. Both courts felt as though the states should only be held
responsible for what they bring on themselves.147 In a financial debt context,
this is especially important because a state that is responsible for the debt of
others can never have true financial stability since it cannot control its own
liability. Though recognizing this principle, neither court established a firm
boundary to guide their respective governments regarding the amount of
liability acceptable for each state.148
The final point of agreement concerned the issue of when sovereignty
should be compromised. The two courts agreed that it simply should not
be.149 They believed that ultimately, the need to maintain sovereignty could
not be outweighed by any cause. As the Court said in Printz, power should
not be “concentrate[d] . . . in one location [even] as an expedient solution to
the crisis of the day.”150
One point raised by the U.S. Supreme Court but not directly touched on
by the BVerfG is the issue of auxiliary control. In Printz, the Supreme Court
ruled that controlling a state’s officials is tantamount to controlling the
state.151 The German court indirectly addressed this in its concerns regarding
budget autonomy, saying that it would not allow another country to dictate
German policy through budgetary control.152
147

See Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 198 (“[N]o permanent mechanisms may be created under
international treaties which are tantamount to accepting liability for decisions by free will of
other states. . . . The Bundestag must individually approve every large-scale federal aid
measure on the international or European Union level made in solidarity resulting in
expenditure.”); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (preventing the federal government from
burdening the states with the downside of a plan and putting them on the hook for the
financial costs of its implementation while retaining for itself the exclusive ability to take
credit for that plan).
148
See Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 201 (“When examining whether the amount of payment
obligations and commitments to accept liability will result in the Bundestag relinquishing its
budget autonomy, the legislature has broad latitude of assessment, in particular with regard to
the risk of the payment obligations and commitments to accept liability being called upon and
with regard to the consequences then to be expected for the budget legislature’s freedom to
act.”); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (forbidding the proposed system while declining to
address any other potential scenarios).
149
See Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 248 (ruling that though the ESM treaty contains no
termination provision, practically speaking it does not violate the Basic Law because it has
other protections in place); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 932–33 (ruling that where a law
violates state sovereignty, “no comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome
that fundamental defect” and thus would be useless).
150
Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
151
Id. at 931 (“To say that the Federal Government cannot control the State, but can control
all of its officers, is to say nothing of significance.”).
152
See Extracts, supra note 18, ¶ 195 (“As representatives of the people, the elected
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B. Maintaining Autonomy
It is not uncommon for treaties to contain language providing that
signatories retain control over certain matters, even though they agree to the
terms within that treaty.153 However, the ESM treaty contains no such
express provisions. Rather, it reads more like a business contract, laying out
terms and conditions as absolute obligations.154 Due to its business-like
nature, this is not necessarily problematic for the ESM because the treaty’s
sphere of authority seems limited to its terms.
In the context of future agreements, however, the ECB may wish to
include language in its treaties that will expressly address the sovereignty
concerns. One example used in other treaties is to expressly concede control
to the signatories in matters within their spheres of competence.155 This
language, while somewhat vague, delineates an area within which the state is
qualified to act and should therefore be allowed to do so as it sees fit. This
approach would benefit the ECB because it appears friendly to the
governments of the member states by reserving authority to them, which will
help with sovereignty concerns.
Also, the ESM contains no limiting language regarding the ECB’s
powers; instead, it grants powers to its member states to act in certain areas.
This approach does not explicitly deny the ECB any authority or powers.
However, the downside of this approach for the ECB is that it leaves open a
large, undefined area for possible overlap between the powers of the treaty
Members of the German Bundestag must retain control of fundamental budgetary decisions
even in a system of intergovernmental governing.”); see also id. ¶ 197 (recognizing as
necessary for maintaining the country’s identity that “the budget legislature makes its
decisions on revenue and expenditure free of other-directedness on the part of the bodies and
of other Member States of the European Union and remains permanently the master of its
decisions.” (internal quotations omitted)).
153
See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 26, art. G, § 5 (amending a prior treaty to contain the
language, “In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by
the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”).
154
See generally Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 11.
155
See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 28, art. 1, § 5 (“The Union shall respect the equality of
Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local selfgovernment. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial
integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In
particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”).
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and those of the individual member states, potentially allowing for clashes
between the two sides in the future. A potential solution would be to use
language that explicitly limits the powers of the ECB to those explicitly
conferred in provisions contained within the treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon
contains such a provision,156 which states:
Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the
Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out
therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the
Treaties remain with the Member States.157
This language is restrictive enough to allow states security, but ambiguous
enough to allow for flexibility and adaptability in situations that arise in the
future given broad competences.
The ECB would certainly need to set such competences for itself if it
chose this path since it would expressly state that it could not exceed its
bounds. The benefits of this approach are clarity for both parties and an
appearance of simplicity via defined boundaries. Both the ECB and the
member states will have a strong foundation on which to base the
expectations of the treaty. The downside for the ECB is obvious—its powers
are expressly confined. Understanding that limiting language in a treaty
could prove injurious to its purpose, the ECB is probably still better served
by recognizing the powers of the member states rather than withholding
those of the treaty; this will also allow more flexibility for members and
likely satisfy their respective sovereignty reservations.
C. Limiting Liability
Provisions that limit the liability members can be required to take on are
another necessary aspect of treaties. Countries want to know that they will
not be exposed to liability for the decisions of other countries. The
Maastricht Treaty contains a rough provision to this effect.158 It prevents a
member state from being responsible for the obligations undertaken by
156

Id. art. 1, § 6.
Id.
158
See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 26, at Title VI, art. 104b, ¶ 1 (“A Member State shall
not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other
public authorities, other bodies governed by public law or public undertakings of another
Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a
specific project.”).
157
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another member state, except where a joint agreement was in place to fund a
specific project.159 While this provision certainly provides some assurance
that liability limitations exist, it is still a vague limiting clause in that it lacks
a cap. The provision was likely intended to be this way to allow for
flexibility in unforeseen situations, given the Maastricht Treaty’s purpose of
establishing the European Union.160 Yet, although the limiting principles
still apply, to address the financial concerns ahead, more assurances will be
needed.
The EU seems to have been cognizant of these concerns and addressed
them in the ESM Treaty. The ESM Treaty not only explicitly states that
members are not liable for ESM commitments “by reason of [the states’]
membership,”161 but also sets a firm cap for the total liability of each
member.162 This type of provision has many advantages. First, it allows for
member states to participate in the program while feeling the security that
their respective obligations will never exceed a pre-established amount.
Second, membership alone does not impose liability on the members for the
debts of the ECB. This provision therefore limits not only the amount of
liability but also how a member can become liable for obligations, thereby
providing more autonomy to members to control when and how much debt
they accept. Finally, the Treaty provides predictability and a level of
financial certainty, which enables the states to maintain budget autonomy
and run their respective countries accordingly. Given the aforementioned
strengths of this provision, mimicking its language in future treaties would
go a long way to satisfy countries’ concerns regarding liability exposure.
D. Exit Strategy
Most treaties omit express provisions on termination or withdrawal.163
The ESM treaty is one example.164 The reason for leaving out such language
159

Id.
See generally id.
161
See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 11, art. 8, ¶ 5
(“No ESM Member shall be liable, by reason of its membership, for obligations of the
ESM.”).
162
See id. (“The liability of each ESM Member shall be limited, in all circumstances, to its
portion of the authorised (sic) capital stock at its issue price.”). It should be noted that other
provisions of the ESM Treaty were challenged on the grounds that, when read in conjunction
with one another, they served to counteract this restricting provision. See Extracts, supra note
18, ¶ 154 (describing how Article 9(2) and (3) as well as Article 25(2) of the ESM Treaty
work to undermine the limitations of Article 8(5)). As previously mentioned, the German
court found this not to be the case. Id. ¶¶ 212–213.
163
United Nations, FINAL CLAUSES OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES HANDBOOK 109–17 (2003),
160
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is understandable. The parties to a treaty, especially one of great
significance, prefer for it to be binding for an indefinite duration. This would
seemingly serve to invest each member in the success of the treaty and, by
extension, the success of the other members. Still, even in instances where
no express denunciation clause exists, countries have ways to leave the
treaty.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention)165
sets out ground rules for leaving a treaty. It allows for termination of a treaty
by consent of the parties166 or in a manner allowed by the treaty if explicitly
included.167 It also contains a section exclusively regarding treaties without
any exit provisions.168 In that portion, the Vienna Convention bars exit from
a treaty that does not expressly allow it, unless it can be proven the parties
intended to allow it169 or the right to do so is “implied by the nature of the
treaty.”170 Either prong presents quite a high standard. In the past, when the
economy was stronger, leaving a treaty may not have raised nearly as many
concerns as would leaving those signed today. This statement is more
accurate when the treaty directly concerns the financial obligations of a
country. As the ECB moves forward, it will behoove it to include such
language and not require their members to utilize the Vienna Convention
standards.
The ECB can accomplish the goal of allowing a country to leave the
treaty in a number of ways.171 It can set a certain duration for the treaty to
exist;172 it can allow for withdrawal after a specified amount of time has
passed;173 it can allow for withdrawal at the occurrence of a specified event;
or it could merely allow for a country’s withdrawal via majority vote of its
current member states.174 Another possibility is to allow for a country to
leave at any time.175 However, this is not a viable option for the ECB’s
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/publications/FC/English.pdf.
164
See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 11 (excluding any
denunciation provisions).
165
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1968, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
166
Id. art. 54(b).
167
Id. art. 54(a).
168
Id. art. 56.
169
Id. art. 56(a).
170
Id. art. 56(b).
171
FINAL CLAUSES, supra note 163, at 109–17.
172
Id. at 115.
173
Id. at 111.
174
Vienna Convention, supra note 165, art. 56(a).
175
FINAL CLAUSES, supra note 163, at 110.
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treaties. Strong commitment of member states is crucial to alleviating the
financial burdens of the EU, and a signatory’s arbitrary exit would have
substantial repercussions on other members. Thus, allowing members to
leave at any time would undermine the stability of the EU.
The first option for the ECB is to set a time limit regarding the duration of
the treaty.176 This route would be the least efficient since there is no way of
knowing how long an emergency economic treaty would be needed. For this
reason, this option should be avoided.
The second alternative locks in the treaty for a certain time period and
then allows for countries to leave under certain circumstances. The
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants177 contains an
example of this provision.178 It provides a three-year fixed duration before
allowing countries to walk away.179 It stipulates, however, that the country
must wait one year to leave once it has provided notification of its intent to
leave.180 This type of provision would be only slightly better than a flat
duration clause because the risk still exists that a country will become less
cooperative as the exit window approaches. It is very unlikely that the
country would be asked to join anything during the lame duck year before
leaving. For these reasons, this option is impractical.
Third, the treaty can include language that allows for withdrawal at the
occurrence of a pre-identified event.181 Given the high financial stakes of the
potential ECB treaties, this option would allow for the countries to exit if
176
For an example of this type of provision, see id. at 115 (illustrating a specified duration
clause by citing Article 60(1) of the International Agreement on Olive Oil and Table Olives of
1986: “This Agreement shall remain in force until 31 December 1991 unless the Council
decides to prolong it, extend it, renew it or terminate it in advance in accordance with the
provisions of this article.”).
177
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S.
119, available at http://www.pops.int/documents/convtext/convtext_en.pdf.
178
Id. art. 28 (“At any time after three years from the date on which this Convention has
entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from the Convention by giving written
notification to the depositary . . . Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon the expiry of one
year from the date of receipt by the depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such
later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.”); see also FINAL CLAUSES,
supra note 163, at 111 (citing Stockholm Convention to provide example of treaty provision).
179
Stockholm Convention, supra note 177, art. 28(1).
180
Id. art. 28(2).
181
For an example of this type of provision, see Treaty of Nice, art. 64, Mar. 3, 2001, http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf (“Until the rules governing the
language arrangements applicable at the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have
been adopted in this Statute, the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice
and of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance governing language arrangements
shall continue to apply.”).
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they simply could not uphold the duties of the treaty or if their respective
current financial state dictated departure. Either of these would set a very
high bar for withdrawal. Also, it would satisfy those countries that desire a
viable exit option without compromising the goal of having countries
invested in the treaty’s success by maintaining a potentially indefinite
duration for the treaty. This Note recommends this type of provision.
Finally, the treaty could include a provision that allows for a country to
withdraw with the consent of the parties to the treaty.182 This would allow
for a country to withdraw without disrupting the treaty or that member’s
relationship with other members. The withdrawal would need to be
approved by a vote of a majority or super-majority. It would also be a
safeguard against countries leaving for unsound reasons since the members
would get the opportunity to hear the leaving party’s rationale and then
decide if it is a sufficient reason to back out of the treaty. However,
ultimately the exiting country is at the mercy of the other members in
withdrawing, therefore this provision may not be accepted by countries with
strong sovereignty concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current global economic crisis will require the European Central
Bank to take action to alleviate financial issues as they arise for the European
Union. In doing so, the ECB will have to be cognizant of the sovereignty
concerns of its respective members. The U.S. Supreme Court and the
German Constitutional Court have both pointed out in their respective cases
several sovereignty principles underlying these concerns.
These principles include: (1) a state should have the autonomy to make
decisions regarding state matters; (2) a state should maintain control over its
budget; (3) a state’s liability exposure should be limited to that which it
creates; (4) a state should not be trapped into a situation which it cannot
escape when it is in its best interest to do so; and (5) and these principles
should not be compromised for any reason.
The ECB has several options in addressing these concerns going forward.
To address the issue of maintaining autonomy over decisionmaking, the ECB
should include in its treaties language that expressly grants to the member
states the power to decide matters within their respective spheres. This will
give them assurance that they are protected from intrusion by the governing
body or other members. The ECB should also include provisions stating that
182

Vienna Convention, supra note 165, art. 56(a).
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the member states are not liable for the commitments of other members or
the ESM. Additionally, it should go a step further and place an absolute cap
on the liability that each state can owe to the Mechanism. This will serve not
only to limit each member’s risk exposure, but will also enable the members’
respective governments to maintain budget autonomy due to the
predictability afforded by a debt ceiling.
Finally, the ECB should include a provision in the treaties that will allow
for a member to exit the treaty at the occurrence of a pre-determined event or
with the consent of the members. Either procedure will allow for the country
to leave the agreement, affording the member states the comfort of knowing
they are not permanently locked in, while maintaining a very high threshold
for that exit. Without appropriate attention to each of these concerns, the
ECB will undoubtedly face more roadblocks than necessary, as more
countries will require greater control over their affairs in a bleak global
marketplace.

